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Introduction
Countries sign international agreements to commit themselves to policy targets. Prominent examples are climate change agreements. When do countries, however, comply with international agreements? We examine a new aspect of when countries are not likely to comply with international agreements: when national government changes. It is conceivable that new governments are less willing to comply with international agreements signed by a previous government, especially when the new and the proceeding government have different platforms.
We use the NATO two percent target to investigate empirically how changes of government influence compliance with an international agreement.
The two percent target has been discussed within NATO since the early 2000s to avoid problems of free-riding when defense burdens are shared. The United States have often criticized NATO allies for free-riding, meaning that it has long been an intriguing issue. The NATO countries agreed on the two percent target at the NATO summit in September 2014.
Allies with military expenditure relative to GDP below 2% committed themselves to no longer decrease military expenditure and to reach the two percent target within the next ten years, i.e. by 2024. Decreasing military expenditure relative to GDP therefore means non-compliance with the two percent target. Because the target year is 2024, full compliance with this target cannot be confirmed yet. Countries that aim to meet the two percent target by 2024, however, will not meet the target overnight, but need to increase military expenditure for many years. We focus on efforts to increase military expenditure relative to GDP by those countries that have not met the two percent target yet. Whether countries reduce their efforts to increase military expenditure relative to GDP after government has changed has important implications for compliance with the two percent target in 2024, because many NATO countries are likely to experience at least one change of government within this ten-year period.
New governments are less willing to comply with international agreements signed by a previous government. The reason is a time inconsistency problem from a nation's perspective related with international agreements. Compliance with international agreements depends on manifold issues such as agreement design, incentives, and cost-effectiveness. Empirical studies have investigated compliance with climate change agreements, anti-pollution standards, international monetary law and human rights treaties.
We use panel data for 27 NATO countries for the period 2010-2018 to examine how a change of government influences the growth rate in military expenditure for those countries that are below the two percent target. We observe rising growth rates in military expenditure for countries below the two percent target after the NATO summit in 2014. Countries that experienced a large change of government, e.g. a change from a rightwing to a leftwing government, after the summit, however, had lower growth rates in military expenditure relative to GDP than countries without such a change. Countries that experienced such a change of government after the NATO summit in 2014 are less likely to comply with the two percent target because they reduce their efforts to reach the target. Future research should investigate how changes of government influence compliance with other international agreements such as climate change and human rights treaties; and how to deal with the credibility problem of national governments when they commit themselves to international agreements.
Background 2.1 Time inconsistency problems and compliance with international agreements
Governments are less likely to comply with international agreements that a previous government has signed. A rational, forward-looking government will adjust policy decisions made in an earlier period because of restrictions the government now faces related to the expectations of optimizing agents (Kydland and Prescott 1977) . Policies are likely to be time inconsistent and sticking to the initial policy would not yield an optimal outcome for a nation (see also Barro and Gordon 1983) . A government that decides whether to comply with a nonbinding agreement such as the NATO two percent target considers decisions of optimizing agents both in the international (e.g., compliance of other governments) and in the domestic domain (e.g., voting behavior of the electorate). A government that does not agree with the international agreement is therefore inclined not to comply with the two percent target to which the country committed itself years ago. The risk of non-compliance is, thus, higher when government has changed after an agreement has been signed. In case of a change of government, the time inconsistency problem refers to the nation rather than to the policymaker who has been replaced. In any event, policymakers sign international agreements in the name of their nation, rather than in the name of themselves; a new government is equally tied to international agreements as the previous government was.
Scholars have examined compliance in the fields of climate policy, anti-pollution standards, monetary law and human rights treaties. International climate policy faces the same problems of free-riding associated with a public good as the NATO does with defense burden sharing. International climate change agreements attempt to deal with free-riding, but compliance is not certain: the complexity of domestic political processes and the challenge of design and enforcement of agreements in the international domain give rise to commitment problems, which induce governments to time inconsistent policies and non-compliance with earlier commitments (Hovi et al. 2009 ). Countries are also more likely to comply with climate change agreements the less cost-effective the measures necessary to comply with the agreements are (Barrett and Stavins 2003) . Incentives play another important role for participation in and compliance with agreements to avoid free-riding behavior (Barrett and Stavins 2003) . It is therefore important to investigate incentives in the context of the two percent target and to infer whether, and to what extent, NATO countries will be expected to comply with an agreement.
The design and acceptance of international treaties influence compliance. Treaties to prevent intentional oil pollution by tankers reveal that compliance with the requirement of rather costly additional equipment for tankers to reduce oil pollution is even higher than compliance with a less cost-effective limit on oil discharge at sea. These differences in compliance are not substantiated in differences in cost-effectiveness. They are rather substantiated in both the design of such standards, which need to be transparent and verifiable, and in differences in the acceptance of these standards at the time they were introduced (Mitchell 1994) .
Peer pressure and reputational concerns are other reasons for countries to comply with international treaties. An empirical study on Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, which forbids restrictions on current international transactions, shows that peer pressure among countries located within the same region lead countries to comply with international monetary law. The probability of compliance with Article VIII is even higher in the first years after monetary restrictions have been abandoned, since countries try to regain their international reputation (Simmons 2000) . Both peer and reputational effects, as well as cost-effectiveness, influence compliance with international laws against human trafficking. Countries favor prevention measures against human trafficking over protection and prosecution measures because prevention satisfies those countries that are most affected by human trafficking inflows on the one hand, and induces less cost and effort on the other (Cho and Vadlamannati 2012) .
Ratification of international treaties on human rights, however, has not been shown to increase the respect of human rights in a country. An effect of ratification, however, is found for countries the more democratic they are and the stronger their civil society is (Keith 1999 , Hathaway 2002 , Neumayer 2015 .
NATO's Two Percent Target
NATO countries have committed themselves to the two percent target at the NATO summit in September 2014 to counteract free-riding. NATO countries contribute to collective security, a public good within NATO, since it is nonrival and no NATO country can be excluded (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966 (Murdoch and Sandler 1984) . Empirical studies arrive at manifold conclusions regarding free-riding within NATO (Murdoch and Sandler 1984 , Oneal 1990 , Sandler 1993 , Hartley and Sandler 1999 , Plümper and Neumayer 2015 , George and Sandler 2018 Secondly, the two percent target is a solely cost-effective policy measure and compliance with it is likely to be at the expense of spending on civilian public goods. The marginal "political" cost of spending on the military instead of on civilian public goods is thus increasing. Countries below the two percent target will be less inclined to further increase military expenditure as they get closer to 2% military expenditure relative to GDP. Thirdly, incentives to comply are limited because no credible sanctioning or penalties exist if countries fail to reach the two percent target. trade-off (see also Bove et al. 2017) . Peer pressure and reputational cost are, moreover, strong incentives to comply with international agreements, which are reduced for new governments.
Peer pressure and reputational cost in case of non-compliance are high since NATO allies represent a fairly homogeneous group of countries, which collaborate in numerous fields other than defense policy. Maintaining reputation in the international domain is important for future collaboration with allied countries in other policy fields. However, reputational costs for not complying with the two percent target will be lower for a new government than for a government that signed the agreement in 2014. The credibility problem for new governments is reduced since it is not their own word they break.
Theory on the determinants of compliance does not clearly indicate whether NATO countries will comply with the two percent target; or whether incentives to free-ride prevail.
We expect, however, that changes of government will have a negative effect on compliance.
For countries below the two percent target, we expect lower growth rates of military expenditure relative to GDP when these countries experienced a change of government after the NATO summit in 2014. In turn, we expect higher growth rates when the same government is still in power. We expect the effect of a change of government on compliance to be stronger the larger the change of government is.
The direction of a change in government ideology, i.e. whether the change occurs from leftwing to rightwing or from rightwing to leftwing, is also likely to influence compliance with the two percent target. Rightwing governments are expected to increase military expenditure because they endorse security and support the hierarchies and discipline that are associated with official data source on defense spending within NATO; figures for 2017 and 2018 are estimates.
We use SIPRI data on military expenditure for a robustness test to confirm our inferences.
By the time of the NATO summit in September 2014, military expenditure relative to GDP was at a historic low: the United States, Greece and the United Kingdom were the only NATO countries with military expenditure relative to GDP above 2% at that time. Figure 1 shows that the United States, Greece and the United Kingdom had military expenditure relative to GDP above 2%. The United States, however, has continuously decreased its military expenditure since 2011 after considerable increases in the years before. We use growth rates in military expenditure relative to GDP for the years after the NATO summit, i.e. 2015-2018, to show differences between countries that had military expenditure relative to GDP of above or below 2% in the previous year. For countries below 2% military expenditure relative to GDP, we distinguish between countries that experienced a change of government after the NATO summit in 2014 and those that did not. We consider two types of changes of government, which also include changes of the political platform: firstly, a small change of government describes a new personnel composition of the cabinet including a small change in government ideology, i.e. a change in the ideology score of one. 8 We measure government ideology by the index of Potrafke (2009) , which is based on Budge et al. (1993) and update it for non-OECD NATO member countries. The index assumes values from 1 (rightwing) to 5 (leftwing). Changes in the government ideology index from year t to year t+1, thus, describe a change in government ideology. A small change of government occurs when government changes and the government ideology index changes by one point, such as from a center to a leftwing government. Out of the 27 NATO countries considered, ten countries have experienced such a small change of government since the NATO summit in September 2014.
Nine of these ten countries had military expenditure relative to GDP of below 2% in at least Portugal decreased military expenditure relative to GDP after the change from a rightwing to a leftwing government in November 2015. The growth rates in military expenditure relative to GDP for Canada and Portugal, which both changed from a rightwing to a leftwing government, and Croatia and Denmark, which both changed from a leftwing to a rightwing government, however, do not indicate that the direction of the government ideology change influences compliance with the two percent target differently.
The descriptive statistics indicate that a change of government is related to compliance with the two percent target depending on how strong the change of government is. Changes of government that include changes in government ideology, or even a change from a rightwing to a leftwing government or vice versa, corroborate that new national governments are less likely to comply with international agreements signed by previous national governments. We elaborate on conditional correlations between changes of government and compliance with the two percent target by estimating panel data models in the next sections.
Empirical strategy
The baseline panel data model has the following form: 
2017). The election dummy variable Election (t+1)it is 1 in years which precede parliamentary
elections. We control for elections because governments in times of elections are likely to shift public spending from military expenditure to social welfare to compete for votes (Bove et al. 2017 ). Secondly, we include variables describing conflicts, as well as internal and external
threats. The dummy variable War (t-1)it indicates whether a country has been involved in an
interstate war (i.e. a war with another country) or an internal war (i.e. a war between a government and internal conflict groups) in year t-1 with at least 25 battle-related deaths. We consider wars in period t-1 because military expenditure is likely to increase with a time lag once a country gets involved in a conflict; in turn, military expenditure is likely to also decrease with a time lag once a conflict has ended, because it takes time to demobilize and military resources need to be replenished. The data for armed conflicts is taken from the 'UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset' (Version 17.2) and defined according to Gleditsch et al. (2002) . The variable Internal threatit proxies domestic conflict probability and a country's internal stability. Table 3 shows the baseline results. Columns (4) and (5) The variable measuring a large change of government after the NATO summit in 2014 has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (4) and at the 10% level when year fixed effects are added in column (5). The positive estimate for the large change of government is attributed to the United States because it is the only country that experienced a large change of government without being below the two percent target. This estimate thus reflects that the United States' average growth rate of military expenditure relative to GDP was on average lower in the years before Donald Trump assumed office than after the Trump administration was in office. 12 The coefficient estimate of the interaction term between countries below the two percent target and with a large change of government is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (4) and at the 5% significance level in column (5) when year fixed effects are added.
Empirical results

Baseline results
The marginal effect of a large change of government for countries below the two percent target (shown below the coefficient estimates in Table 3 ) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in column (1), at the 5% level in columns (2) and (3), at the 10% level in column (4) and again at the 5% level when year fixed effects are added in column (5). The size of the marginal effect indicates that countries below the two percent target in the previous year that experienced a large change of government decreased growth rates by up to 4.8 percentage points. The effect of 4.8 percentage points is quite large. It is almost half the size of the 9.8 percentage points increase for NATO countries which had military expenditure relative to GDP of below 2% in the previous year and did not experience a change in government ideology. And it is larger than the 3.8% average growth rate of military expenditure relative to GDP (median:
2.3%; see Figure 4 ) for all NATO countries in the years after the NATO summit.
The coefficient for rightwing governments, Rightwingit, and the coefficient for an upcoming election, Election (t+1)it, do not turn out to be statistically significant in columns (3) to (5). The coefficients for War (t-1)it, i.e. an armed conflict in the previous year, and Internal threatit are statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (3) to (5), except for the coefficient for Internal threatit which is significant at the 5% significance level in column (5). A war in the previous year is associated with an increase in the growth rate of military expenditure relative to GDP by up to 10.1 percentage points. The positive relationship of both previous war and internal threat and the growth rate of military expenditure relative to GDP is in line with earlier findings (Collier and Hoeffler 2007 , Dunne et al. 2008 , Blum 2018 , 2019 . The coefficient of the dummy variable Crimeait is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level in column (4). The coefficients for the growth rates of GDP, population and government debt relative to GDP added in column (4) do not turn out to be statistically significant. These results do not support findings of previous studies using military expenditure as the dependent variable.
Studies which control for GDP and population use larger samples and include developing countries or both developing and developed countries (Dunne et al. 2008 , Albalate et al. 2012 , Blum 2018 , Pamp et al. 2018 . We focus, however, on the rather homogeneous group of NATO countries. Samples of studies which control for government debt include European countries or NATO members, i.e. rather homogeneous groups of countries. However, these empirical models are estimated in levels or first differences rather than in growth rates (Christie 2017, Odehnal and Neubauer 2018) . Column (5) also includes fixed year effects but the results hardly differ from those in column (4). The year fixed effects in column (5) do not turn out to be statistically significant except for the years 2012 and 2013, for which the fixed effect is positive and significant at the 5% and the 10% level (not reported). An F-Test on the joint significance of the fixed year effects shows that the year fixed effects are jointly significant at the 10% level.
Estimation results for changes of government which distinguish between changes from leftwing to rightwing and changes from rightwing to leftwing do not indicate that the direction of the government ideology change influences compliance with the two percent target (results not shown).
Robustness Tests
We examine the robustness of our results for large changes of government. (Table 4) . 13 The coefficient for rightwing governments is negative and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level in columns (3) Secondly, we apply a spatial lag model to account for spatial dependences in military expenditure among NATO allies. Following the Security Web concept of Rosh (1988) , growth rates in military expenditure relative to GDP are likely to be influenced by neighboring countries with which a country shares a common border (Blum 2018) . We therefore estimate a spatial autoregressive model (SAR) following Anselin (1988) , which controls for growth rates in military expenditure relative to GDP of countries with a common land or sea border using maximum likelihood estimation. 14 Table 5 shows that the results hardly differ from the baseline estimation results. The coefficient estimate of the spatial lag of military expenditure relative to GDP is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1), (2) and (4) 
Conclusion
We have examined whether changes of government influence compliance with international agreements by means of the NATO two percent target. Whether countries reduce their efforts to increase military expenditure relative to GDP after a change of government has important implications for compliance with the two percent target in 2024, because many NATO countries are likely to experience changes of government within this ten-year period. We have used panel data for 27 NATO countries for the period 2010-2018 and found that countries that experienced a large change of government, e.g. a change of government from leftwing to rightwing or vice versa, are less likely to comply with the two percent target than countries that did not experience such a change of government after the NATO summit in 2014. Changes of government, however, do not turn out to be statistically significant when changes in government ideology are rather small, e.g. changes to or away from a center government.
The sample size with 27 NATO countries we observed from 2010-2018 is small and only few countries experienced a large change of government after the NATO summit in 2014
for which we found the negative effect on growth rates in military expenditure relative to GDP.
Investigating whether changes of government influence compliance with international agreements, however, is a worthwhile endeavor, even when samples are small.
We propose that international treaties and agreements need to be designed in a way that encourage compliance even when a government that has signed the treaty or agreement is no longer in power. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in year-on-year growth rates. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in year-on-year growth rates. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in year-on-year growth rates.
